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Abstract The goal of disaster recovery is for survivors 
to regain stability in their lives, livelihoods, and housing. A 
people-centered housing recovery requires that residents are 
empowered to make decisions about their housing reconstruc-
tion, and that policies create housing options that support the 
ability of all residents to reconstruct their homes and lives. The 
1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake caused the largest amount 
of damage in Japan since World War II, and the subsequent 
recovery is a starting point for understanding contemporary 
post-disaster housing reconstruction policies in Japan. Beyond 
an overview of housing reconstruction programs, we can 
understand the impact these policies had on Kobe residents’ 
housing and community recovery. In many cases, housing 
policies implemented after the Kobe earthquake fragmented 
communities and caused further damage and disruption in the 
lives of the survivors. A single-track approach failed to support 
the entire population of the disaster-stricken area. In subse-
quent years, Japanese disaster reconstruction laws and 
policies have seen modifications and improvements. Some of 
these changes can be seen in cases of recovery after more 
recent disasters, notably after the 2004 Chuetsu Earthquake 
in Niigata Prefecture. In the context of these past examples, 
we can consider what is needed for a people-centered 
recovery in the Tohoku area after the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami.
Keywords Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, housing policy, hous-
ing reconstruction, Kobe, people-centered housing recovery
1 Introduction
This article considers the concept of people-centered housing 
recovery and how it can be applied in the Japanese post-
disaster context. The housing recovery process after the 1995 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake is reconsidered within the frame-
work of people-centered housing recovery. Our assessment is 
based on key sources published in English that describe and 
explain the housing reconstruction process in Kobe and more 
recent changes in policies that affect housing recovery and 
reconstruction in Japan. After clarifying the main aspects of 
housing recovery in Kobe and key differences in later recovery 
processes, especially after the 2004 Chuetsu Earthquake in 
Niigata Prefecture, we offer some recommendations towards 
a more people-centered housing recovery after the 2011 Great 
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in Tohoku.
The following section introduces the term “people-
centered housing recovery” in the context of related terms 
used in disaster recovery literature and posits key aspects of 
people-centered housing recovery in Japan. We then focus on 
two primary aspects of the basic housing recovery policy af-
ter the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake: (1) the main single-track 
approach of the reconstruction process, in which the govern-
ment built temporary housing and then permanent public 
rental housing; and (2) the lack of compensation or support 
for homeowners to rebuild their houses or privately owned 
rental structures. We then summarize subsequent changes in 
housing reconstruction policies and processes, especially 
after the 2004 Chuetsu Earthquake, considering how they 
became more people-centered, including policies for public 
housing construction, compensation for damaged private 
housing stock, consideration for keeping communities 
together, and flexibility in reconstruction options at the 
community and individual levels. After reflecting on the cases 
of housing recovery in Kobe and Niigata, we conclude with 
some thoughts about possible people-centered housing 
recovery in the Tohoku region. 
2 People-Centered Housing Recovery
The term “people-centered” or the phrase “putting people 
at the center” has gained traction within the international 
post-disaster reconstruction community and has been defined 
as a basic and fundamental approach to disaster recovery. 
In a section titled “Achieving People-Centered, Integrated 
Reconstruction,” the World Bank publication Safer Homes, 
Stronger Communities explains the fundamental importance 
of a people-centered aspect of disaster reconstruction: 
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It can’t be emphasized strongly enough that the affected 
population should be at the center of the reconstruction 
process and should have preferential right to make the 
decisions that will affect their lives. . . [the] government’s 
first job after a disaster, with the help of humanitarian and 
development agencies, is to determine what the community is 
capable of doing. The government should then do the rest. 
(World Bank 2010, 7)
Recent publications from several other international 
development organizations dealing with disaster recovery 
work also include “the importance of a people-centered 
approach”i (UN-Habitat 2010) and the idea that “people must 
be at the center of human development”ii (UNDP 2011). After 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Indonesian government 
adopted the principle of a people-centered recovery process 
(BAPPENAS 2005), which has also been endorsed by the 
Asian Coalition for Housing Rights and collaborators in Sri 
Lankaiii (ACHR 2005). In these examples, we can see that 
“people-centered” is usually used to refer to the process while 
“putting people at the center” of the reconstruction is equated 
with members of the affected population making the 
decisions that will shape the recovery.
2.1 Housing Reconstruction Approaches
The literature classifies international housing reconstruction 
projects into several main approaches based on who is 
controlling the rebuilding process, including both the funding 
and actual construction. The “owner-driven” approach to 
housing reconstruction is one that has been identified as a 
specific way of putting people in charge of their own recovery 
choices. Owner-Driven Housing Reconstruction Guidelines 
states, “whether we call them owner-driven, community-
based or assisted self-help projects there is evidences of 
growing interest in the use of participatory approaches for 
post-disaster recovery and reconstruction” (IFRC 2010, 5). 
International groups working in disaster reconstruction 
increasingly support and endorse the owner-driven approach. 
In a comparison of different housing provision approaches 
used in reconstruction in Gujarat, Barenstein defines the 
owner-driven approach as that which
enables communities to undertake building work themselves, 
with external, financial, material and technical assistance. 
Owner driven reconstruction does not necessarily imply that 
owners build the house on their own, but that, within given 
building codes, they retain full control over the housing 
reconstruction process. (Barenstein 2006, 2)
Although owner-driven housing recovery is one example 
of a people-centered process, it targets one group of residents 
only (home owners) while excluding others (renters, those 
without formal housing tenure). However, the idea behind 
the owner-driven approach is crucial for a people-centered 
housing recovery: residents retain control over the process of 
rebuilding their own houses.
While the term “owner-driven” usually describes a recon-
struction process after disaster, when funding or materials are 
provided to residents who then build their own homes, after 
the earthquake in Kobe there were a number of cases where 
home owners also took the lead in reconstructing their own 
temporary housing without external support. The Japanese 
word jiriki literally means “self-power,” and it is used to 
describe buildings that were constructed after the Kobe 
earthquake through the efforts of the residents themselves, 
especially self-built temporary housing. As is the case with 
owner-driven housing reconstruction in general, residents did 
not necessarily do the actual construction of this self-built 
housing in Kobe themselves. 
2.2 Participation
There are several authors who use the term “people-centered 
housing reconstruction,” notably Lyons, Shilderman, and 
Boano (2010) in Building Back Better: Delivering People-
Centered Housing Reconstruction at Scale. The contribution 
of this publication is to “analyze the potential for large-scale 
reconstruction to be participatory and developmental for 
and of ordinary people—‘people centered reconstruction’” 
(Lyons, Shilderman, and Boano 2010, 2). As they claim that 
“donor-driven reconstruction is inappropriate, and owner-
driven reconstruction is too exclusive” (Lyons, Shilderman, 
and Boano 2010, 7), these authors emphasize the importance 
of shifting from supply-driven relief mode to a reconstruction 
mode that ought to be more support-driven and people-
centered. The idea of people-centered housing recovery is 
closely connected with participation in the planning or design 
process, and the term is often used interchangeably with 
owner-driven and self-built. 
2.3 Putting People at the Center—Housing Policies that 
Support Life Recovery
People-centered housing recovery can be understood as a 
concept that calls for residents to play a central role in making 
reconstruction decisions, and also supports owner-driven 
and/or self-built reconstruction. Yet beyond these important 
aspects, people-centered housing recovery can be considered 
to be a broader concept including policy, process, and housing 
design.
Along with the full participation of residents, people-
centered reconstruction also needs official policies that are 
supportive of comprehensive solutions for all members of the 
community. Involving residents and even putting them in 
control of reconstruction decisions is not enough. Residents’ 
opinions and housing needs must be addressed and supported 
by reconstruction policies and their implementation. A 
successful and people-centered recovery requires support 
from government, timely decisions and clear information, 
adequate and equitable funding, and policies that lead to a 
smooth housing recovery, with no gaps in beneficiaries and 
minimal delays. 
To be accountable to residents’ housing needs, housing 
reconstruction policies must support the life recovery of 
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disaster survivors. This article considers how Japan’s housing 
reconstruction policy could be more people-centered, and 
support the life recovery of disaster survivors through 
sufficiently addressing post-disaster housing needs. While 
people-centered housing recovery also has a relationship with 
more detailed aspects, such as citizen participation methods 
and specific urban planning issues such as land readjustment 
and redevelopment, the focus of this article is on the role of 
housing policies that support a people-centered recovery.
2.4 People-Centered Housing Recovery Issues in 
Japanese Policy 
Japan is a developed country with extensive experience 
facing disasters and an established legal framework and 
government policy dealing with disaster prevention, response, 
and reconstruction. The housing reconstruction process in 
Japan is extremely standardized (from evacuation, temporary 
housing, to permanent housing) and organized by the govern-
ment. The underlying principles of people-centered housing 
reconstruction apply directly in Japan at the levels of (1) over-
all policy that supports the residents and a housing recovery 
that supports their life recovery; (2) the involvement of com-
munity members and their opinions in the recovery process; 
and (3) support for the reconstruction of housing that matches 
the needs and desires of the residents for their living environ-
ment, which is closely connected to the existence of sufficient 
options so that residents have the ability to make choices for 
housing reconstruction that support their life recovery. 
During the recovery after the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earth-
quake in Kobe, several issues crucial to a people-centered 
housing recovery stand out. (1) The needs of all disaster 
survivors should be equitably addressed regardless of age, 
gender, land or building tenure, family structure, and level of 
housing damage. (2) The housing recovery process should be 
as smooth as possible, with limited relocation and lifestyle 
disruptions. (3) Communities should be kept together if 
possible and their return to former neighborhoods should be 
supported (in accordance with hazard mitigation).
3 Housing Damage after the Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake
The magnitude 7.2 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake on 17 January 
1995 killed over 6400 people and destroyed over 240,000 
houses. Much of the damage was concentrated in dense 
low-rise areas of Kobe City where older wooden houses were 
common. These wooden houses, many of them low-rent row 
houses, caught fire after the earthquake. Because earthquake 
debris blocked the narrow streets there was no way to get 
emergency vehicles into these areas, and with rare exception 
when neighbors were able to extinguish them quickly, 
these fires burned for days, completely destroying whole 
neighborhoods. Compared to Kobe City in general, the areas 
that burned were predominantly home to lower-income 
residents and accordingly high concentrations of cheap 
privately owned rental housing. Rent for old wooden housing 
is affordable because of the buildings’ age, and once 
destroyed, it is extremely difficult to replace this affordable 
housing stock. Housing damage was therefore especially 
severe for the vulnerable (low-income) tenants in these 
areas. 
3.1 Temporary Housing
At the peak, there were 220,000 displaced victims staying in 
599 emergency shelters (Hirayama 2000). The government 
refused to distribute any cash assistance for rebuilding, in-
stead relying on in-kind support in the form of temporary 
housing units based on the provisions of the Disaster Relief 
Act. Edgington argues this was clearly incompatible with the 
large-scale devastation and needs in post-earthquake Kobe 
(Edgington 2010, 58). Based on the Disaster Relief Act, 
temporary housing in Japan is limited to households unable 
to help themselves. People whose houses are completely 
destroyed by fire, collapse, flood, or are unable to find houses 
with their own funds qualify (Hirayama 2000). 
Temporary housing was mainly a single story steel bar-
racks type, with 2 rooms and up to 26 m2 floor area per unit. 
These were built quickly and uncomfortably hot in summer 
and cold in winter. With 149,000 units of housing damaged 
in the quake, the Japanese national government provided 
funding to the local government to build and manage 48,500 
temporary housing units. The first 30,000 were completed by 
the end of March 1995; the rest were completed by August, 
seven months after the earthquake (Edgington 2010). 
The main problems with temporary housing were inconve-
nient location on the outskirts of the city, low quality con-
struction materials, cramped living spaces, lack of convenient 
medical and shopping facilities (Hirayama 2000), and lack of 
insulation and sound proofing. Temporary housing sites 
in Kobe lacked social facilities, green spaces, and many 
were built in isolated areas. The number of people living in 
temporary housing decreased gradually, although three years 
after the earthquake, there were still about 14,000 households 
living in temporary housing. As of April 1998, 45 percent of 
the temporary housing units were still occupied (Hirayama 
2000).
3.2 Location of Temporary Housing—Inconvenient for 
Daily Life
To construct the large number of needed housing units, it was 
difficult to find available publicly-owned land, as required by 
law. Kobe City happened to own some open land that was 
planned for development, but it was in remote locations, 
which made it difficult for people living in temporary housing 
there to commute to work. Many people therefore chose to 
stay in emergency evacuation centers or parks (instead of 
moving into temporary housing) up to a year after the earth-
quake, until they were forced to move out (Edgington 2010).
Maly and Shiozaki. Towards a Policy that Supports People-Centered Housing Recovery 59
3.3 Gaps between Those Who Wanted, Needed, and 
Entered Temporary Housing
Although the policy created by Hyogo Prefecture did not 
apply any strict criteria for entering temporary housing, not 
everyone who wanted or needed temporary housing received 
it, due to construction delays, lack of supply, and beneficiary 
gaps that were created in the selection process. Hirayama 
(2000) explains that in order to qualify for temporary 
housing, it was important that applicants were staying in an 
evacuation shelter at that time; when the evacuation shelters 
closed, the construction of temporary housing also stopped. 
In addition, many victims gave up on receiving temporary 
housing because of the long construction times. Therefore, 
fewer people actually moved into temporary housing than had 
hoped to. People who did not enter temporary housing, and 
had to find alternative housing even temporarily, in some 
cases became left out of further public programs. One reason 
for this is that people who were living elsewhere did not have 
access to all of the reconstruction information that was 
distributed mainly to residents of government supplied 
temporary housing. Although neighborhood and community 
groups made efforts to circulate newsletters to former 
residents, many people who moved away from their former 
neighborhoods did not receive this information, and it was not 
always easy for them to stay informed and know the most 
current information regarding opportunities that would have 
been available to them during the later reconstruction process, 
such as compensation for land or eligibility for public 
housing.
3.4 Temporary Housing Units Assigned by Prioritized 
Lottery—Randomized Entry
Temporary housing units were allocated through a lottery 
system, which gave priority to the elderly, disabled people, or 
other vulnerable groups. While the idea to provide additional 
support to vulnerable members of the community is admira-
ble, it does not consider the entire community, excludes many 
from needed support, and does not take into account the effect 
of grouping vulnerable populations together in temporary 
housing. When the impact on overall community networks is 
considered holistically, the randomized selection of tempo-
rary housing residents led to communities being fragmented 
and displaced from their former neighborhoods, and also to 
high concentrations of elderly people in temporary housing. 
Being displaced from where they had lived their whole lives 
and not knowing any of their neighbors was especially hard 
for elderly residents, who made up 30 percent of temporary 
housing residents, although they made up only 14 percent 
of the city’s overall population in 1995 (Edgington 2010). 
“Solitary death,” where elderly residents passed away 
without anyone noticing, became a recurring issue in both 
temporary and later in public housing and meant that many 
elderly people were living without any social connections. 
The temporary housing program led to the creation of a group 
with a serious need for support—overwhelmingly low-
income and elderly individuals (Hirayama 2000). In Decem-
ber 1995, 47 percent of households in temporary housing 
had elderly members, in February/March 1996, 42 percent 
of households in temporary housing had elderly members 
(Hirayama 2000). Only 40 percent of temporary housing 
residents were employed, and 34 percent lived on a retirement 
pension. About 29 percent of people living in temporary 
housing earned less than 1 million yen per year (approximatel y 
USD 10,000 in 1995/1996) and 70 percent earned less than 
three million yen (Hirayama 2000).
4 The Single-Track Approach: From 
Temporary Housing to Public Housing
After the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the main governmental 
support for housing recovery in Kobe took the form of mate-
rial compensation in a one-size-fits-all solution: temporary 
housing construction, followed by “disaster recovery public 
housing” construction. Koshiyama (2011) outlines the 
general argument for this solution, which is that it supports 
the lowest income segments of the population, although it 
can also be criticized as an inflexible single-track approach. 
One main problem with this single-track approach was that 
it ignored and provided no support for homeowners or 
landlords who wanted to rebuild their houses, apartments, or 
shops, focusing instead on one single way to provide housing 
for only the most desperate segment of the population, while 
leaving everyone else to fend for themselves. In addition, the 
single-track approach was inflexible because if residents 
deviated from it during an earlier phase (emergency shelter, 
or later temporary housing) they were unable to regain access 
to the support in the later phase (temporary housing or public 
housing). People who chose to stay near their place of 
employment, children’s school, or their own business instead 
of entering temporary housing could not receive any housing 
support. If the temporary housing within the single-track did 
not match the residents’ housing needs, there were no other 
options besides relying on their own means. Along with these 
problems intrinsic to an inflexible single-track approach, 
there were a number of specific problems with temporary 
housing as it was provided in Kobe. These include the livabil-
ity of the units themselves, inconvenient and distant locations, 
and the entry process with lotteries as well as long waiting 
times, which repeatedly scattered former communities during 
multiple phases of the process. While not all of the temporary 
housing was in locations far from original residential areas, it 
was the norm. Small business owners faced an additional 
hardship, as moving away from their former neighborhoods 
to disaster temporary housing made it almost impossible to 
rebuild their stores and companies.
Although not as well known, there were many examples of 
residents who rather than following the government-supported 
single-track approach, constructed their own self-built tem-
porary housing or business. This does not mean necessarily 
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that they did the construction themselves, but rather they paid 
for, and provided these structures for themselves. There was 
no support from the government for these efforts. Compared 
to temporary housing provided by the government, self-built 
housing allowed residents to stay close to their former neigh-
borhoods; self-built reconstruction was often the best option 
for rebuilding stores or businesses, as it allowed business 
owners to restart their operations in their former customers’ 
neighborhoods. The single-track approach in Kobe of tempo-
rary housing followed by the provision of disaster recovery 
public housing, recreated many of the same challenges 
for residents twice—remote locations, randomized entry by 
lottery (fragmenting communities), and long waits. Since the 
single-track approach included both of these stages that could 
be very disruptive to the lives of the residents, self-built hous-
ing had the advantage of providing continuity for the dweller, 
not requiring multiple moves, and preventing dislocation 
from their original neighborhood. For those who used the 
self-built structures for companies or stores, it allowed them 
to resume business more quickly, which has an obvious 
positive effect on livelihood recovery. In addition, the cost of 
temporary housing, paid by the national government, is for a 
disposable structure—only used for 2–5 years. In contrast, 
self-built housing allows the value invested in the house to be 
accrued, and not discarded. Yet there was no provision for 
government to support this kind of housing reconstruction 
after the Kobe earthquake or other more recent disasters.
5 Permanent Housing Reconstruction in 
Kobe—Government-Driven
The government’s permanent housing recovery policy for 
the victims of the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was to provide 
disaster recovery public housing. Similar to the temporary 
housing phase where there was one single type of support 
available, although there were some alternative types of 
recovery housing (co-operative housing, elderly support 
housing, and so on) disaster recovery public housing was the 
only choice available for most disaster victims. As opposed to 
the owner-driven approach introduced in section 2, official 
housing reconstruction in Kobe was completely government-
driven, with beneficiary residents having very little choice or 
control over their housing options. Similar to temporary 
housing, most public housing was also located far from 
residents’ former neighborhoods, and made it difficult for 
them to recover their daily life. Relying exclusively on public 
housing, the housing recovery process included almost no 
support for homeowners or landlords to rebuild homes or 
rental properties. 
5.1 Permanent Disaster Recovery Public Housing 
The basic plan for permanent housing recovery was the Kobe 
City Emergency Three Year Plan for Housing Reconstruction, 
which was made public in July 1995 (Hirayama 2000). It 
called for 72,000 units of housing to be started between 1995–
1997; 10,000 units (14 percent) were planned as public hous-
ing for low-income people; and 30,500 units (42 percent) 
were planned as publicly subsidized housing, including semi-
public housing, replacement (mainly low-income) housing 
related to redevelopment, and subsidized moderate-income 
private rental housing (Hirayama 2000). A year later, in July 
1996, the Kobe Housing Restoration Plan was released. Based 
on the serious situation of temporary housing and the needs 
of the poor and elderly, the number of public housing units 
was increased from 10,000 to 16,000. This increase was to 
be achieved by leasing private rental housing as well as the 
construction of new housing. The overall number of housing 
units in the plan remained 72,000 (Hirayama 2000). In total, 
there were 24,512 new public housing units constructed in 
Kobe (Olshansky et al. 2005), and whereas this is a significant 
number overall, the public housing provided in areas that had 
sustained the most damage did not come close to replacing 
the loss of 30,642 units of affordable low-rise wooden housing 
in Kobe. For example, in Nagata Ward, which had lost 11,711 
houses, there were only 3171 units of public housing provided 
(Olshansky et al. 2005). 
Additional subsidies from the central government were 
introduced to reduce public housing rent. An amendment to 
the Public Housing Act of 1996 created an income-sensitive 
rent system. Rent was based on income, location, and size of 
the unit. The additional state subsidy was to continue for five 
years after moving in (Hirayama 2000) and was subsequently 
extended several times. Although income restrictions for pub-
lic housing were loosened, 30 percent of units were reserved 
for elderly, disabled, and single-parent families as priority 
housing. The process for entering disaster recovery public 
housing gave a priority to temporary housing residents. In 
July 1996, 60 percent of new public housing units were set 
aside for temporary housing residents; if an applicant was not 
selected by lottery for the 60 percent reserved for temporary 
housing residents, he or she could try again for the remaining 
40 percent of the spaces available for general victims. In April 
1998, the number of public housing units reserved for tempo-
rary housing residents was increased to 80 percent (Hirayama 
2000). The demand for public housing far outstripped the 
supply. By May 1998 there were 123,740 applications 
received for the 26,559 units (Olshansky et al. 2005).
Murosaki (2007) identifies three problems with the 
provision of public housing: it was limited to elderly and 
low-income groups; construction took a long time; and dis-
tant locations meant that many victims left the earthquake-
stricken area. As was the case with temporary housing, the 
process for entering permanent disaster recovery public 
rental housing caused disruption in the lives and communities 
of disaster survivors. Once again, the single-track approach 
meant that although there were problems with the process of 
entering and/or living in disaster recovery public housing, 
there were few other support mechanisms in place to help 
low-income residents rebuild their homes besides relying on 
disaster recovery public housing.
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5.2 Public Housing within Japan’s Two-Tiered System 
As Hirayama (2000) explains, Japanese housing policy is a 
two-tiered system. Policies supporting home ownership, 
including low-interest loans, are directed at people who are 
expected to purchase or rent their home as a market commod-
ity. Public housing is built and owned by the government, and 
rented to low-income households, and beneficiaries are 
limited. Policies for housing recovery are based on this same 
framework, and although the scale of housing destruction 
led to the mass construction of temporary housing and then 
permanent public housing, inverting the usual ratio of welfare 
and self-help housing, the two-tiered system itself remained 
constant (Hirayama 2000). 
Hirayama (2000) explains how the two-tiered system 
divided earthquake victims socio-spatially and ignored the 
diverse situations of the victims:
In reality, the victims have diverse needs in regard to public 
resources: victims in need of effective support, households in 
need of complementary support and those with the ability 
to help themselves. However, if the principle of self-help is 
applied, most of the earthquake-hit people are forced to 
reconstruct their houses through their own efforts and welfare 
housing supply necessarily becomes residual. (Hirayama 
2000, 120)
Actually, those in the self-help group under the two-tiered 
system also may need public support for reconstruction, but 
are excluded, as there was no provision for support outside 
the welfare housing track of the two-tiered system. At the 
same time, those receiving support in the form of public 
housing may become segregated, leading to stigmatization. 
5.3 Minimal Support for Private Reconstruction
This rigid two-tiered system leads to a housing recovery that 
is not people-centered in two connected ways. First, it creates 
huge gaps in beneficiaries—an entire sector of the population 
who cannot receive support for what they want to do, which 
is to rebuild or repair their formerly owned houses. Secondly, 
through this exclusion, the policy actively denies residents 
the option to make their own housing choices. With no 
support for reconstruction of private homes, people without 
their own sources of financial means were faced with public 
housing as their only option. Not only were they not able 
to choose their own housing situation, but by excluding the 
option of reconstruction, residents’ control over their own 
living environment was drastically reduced. Private housing 
provides more flexibility for designs that match the residents’ 
needs, while with few exceptions, Japanese public housing 
units are uniform and not adaptable, and in high-rise build-
ings. In addition to homeowners, shop owners and landlords 
(including those of private affordable rental housing) had no 
access to support, which in turn left their former tenants with 
few options, as even the subsidized rents were too expensive 
for the target group. 
After the Kobe Housing Restoration Plan of July 1996, the 
City of Kobe launched various programs to encourage house 
rebuilding in the urban area: temporary rent subsidies for 
those who moved into private rental housing, loans for the 
elderly for reconstruction of their houses holding a mortgage 
on real estate, aid for projects in which two or more victims 
construct housing collectively on a site obtained by combin-
ing small lots, and aid for projects in which narrow streets are 
made wider. However, these programs had limited coverage 
and were difficult to carry out, especially those that required 
agreement among multiple landowners, such as joint and 
cooperative housing.
Disaster survivors wanted to return, but it was very diffi-
cult to find or rebuild replacement housing in their former 
neighborhoods. Two reasons for this were that most people in 
Kobe did not have any insurance money, and there were no 
loan agencies they could borrow from, at least initially. There 
were some low-interest loans available from the Housing 
Loan Corporation, Hyogo Prefecture, and the City of Kobe 
created a low-interest housing loan program from the 
Hanshin Earthquake Recovery Fund, which made loans to 
homeowners and condominium owners with no other funding 
for repairs (Edgington 2010). However, elderly residents did 
not have enough credit to access these programs. Double 
loans (taking out another loan for rebuilding in addition to an 
original loan) was another hardship faced by local residents. 
Working-age people were forced to take out extra loans for 
rebuilding their homes. Younger people and/or landowners 
were often able to rebuild in a year or two (Edgington 2010). 
Older people, those who owned land but did not have other 
resources, or those who had been living in private rental 
housing had no other choice but to rely on public housing 
assistance (Edgington 2010).
5.4 Reconstruction of Private Affordable Rental 
Housing
After the earthquake, rental housing was in short supply, as 
many units of affordable, privately owned rental housing had 
been destroyed by the fires. While public housing was meant 
to replace low-rent private rental housing, it failed to do 
so (Hirayama 2000). Low-rent private rental housing was in 
urban areas, with many choices for residents and no criteria 
for income or identification. Public housing is difficult to 
construct in large numbers in urban areas, requires income 
and identification qualification, and has long and complicated 
move-in processes. Hirayama (2000) identified these as 
crucial issues for low-income renters, which means that many 
former residents of low-rent private apartments that were 
destroyed would not have been eligible for formal rental 
contracts due to a number of factors such as insufficient 
income, lack of established registration or guarantor. If only 
the number of units is considered, rental housing lost due to 
the earthquake was replaced by new constructions. However, 
this is not the case when affordability is considered. Although 
categorized “affordable,” these new, often mass-produced, 
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studio or prefabricated units require security deposits and 
higher rents compared to older private rental housing. These 
new units are therefore out of reach of the low-income 
residents who relied on private rental housing pre-quake. This 
kind of very cheap housing is impossible to replace, since the 
property owners rarely have the means or the motivation to 
rebuild it, as the rent they could collect is much lower than the 
construction cost they would have to pay.
6 Changes in Housing Reconstruction 
Policy since the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
Faced with the urgent need to provide temporary and 
then permanent housing in large numbers after the Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake, the government’s large-scale plans (mass 
temporary housing sites followed by high-rise public housing, 
both located far from former neighborhoods and the city 
center) did not carefully consider the detailed impact on the 
daily lives of the affected residents at the community level. 
Temporary housing and public housing recovery policies also 
created displacement from which many severely stricken 
communities could not recovery.
The single-track approach left many people with no 
support, and public housing, which was the main focus of 
permanent housing reconstruction, also created difficulties 
for residents. The strict limitation on spending public funds to 
compensate private homeowners had a detrimental effect on 
residents’ abilities to rebuild. From the example of Kobe, the 
detrimental effect of mass relocation and scattering of com-
munities was understood, as well as support needed in addition 
to the construction of physical housing alone.
In the years since the reconstruction in Kobe, some 
reconstruction policies have been modified, and have provided 
broader and more comprehensive support for survivors 
of later disasters, notably the 2004 Chuetsu Earthquake in 
Niigata Prefecture. Restrictions on providing compensation 
for private homeowners have been eased and disaster recovery 
public housing has been built at a smaller scale that is more 
community-friendly. The benefit of keeping communities 
together through the entire resettlement process, and the 
special needs of elderly evacuees and others is much better 
understood, and these issues are increasingly considered 
along with the physical reconstruction. Reconstruction 
programs have moved away from the single-track approach 
used in Kobe, although some groups are still left out of the 
reconstruction assistance programs.
Since the context of each disaster is unique, there are 
undoubtedly aspects of the reconstruction process in Niigata 
Prefecture beyond policy that have influenced recovery. 
However, post-disaster recovery processes that occurred 
after disasters in later years following Kobe’s reconstruction, 
especially in Chuetsu, clearly show the impact of housing 
reconstruction policy changes. Key aspects of these modifica-
tions and their implementation can been seen in the programs 
for temporary housing and permanent housing reconstruction, 
especially compensation for homeowners.
6. 1 Temporary Housing after the Chuetsu Earthquake 
Nine and a half year after the earthquake in Kobe, the magni-
tude 6.8 Chuetsu Earthquake struck a rural mountainous area 
of Niigata Prefecture on 23 October 2004. Compared to Kobe, 
there were fewer casualties—39 people lost their lives. 
The scale of housing damage was severe, with over 100,000 
people evacuated from their homes during the peak time of 
the first few days. This number steadily decreased, to 80,000 
after one week, and 6500 after a month (Iuchi 2010b). In 
the following temporary housing phase, there were 3460 
temporary housing units constructed. At the peak time in 
March 2005, there were 9649 people in 2935 households 
living in temporary housing (Iuchi 2010a). 
Iuchi explains how governments in the region looked to 
the example of what had happened to communities in Kobe 
and tried to avoid repeating “bitter lessons learned from the 
1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, in which shelters provided 
at isolated sites disrupted community ties and intensified 
mental isolation and depression of the victims” (Iuchi 2010a, 
71). Local government made every effort to support a recovery 
process that kept communities together and minimized 
displacement, and were “particularly careful about restoring 
the social fabric of affected communities throughout the entire 
process of resettlement” (Iuchi 2010a, 9). This was supported 
in many ways, including the design and layout of temporary 
housing and the creation of welfare support facilities on site. 
6.2 Permanent Housing Reconstruction 
As had been the case in Kobe, disaster survivors after the 
Chuetsu Earthquake had two options for permanent housing: 
rebuilding on their own or moving into public housing built 
by the government. However, compared to the experience of 
Kobe, both of these options were supported in ways to lessen 
the negative impact on residents and communities. Public 
housing was constructed at a smaller scale than the high 
rises in Kobe, and residents were more likely to know their 
neighbors, as communities had been kept together throughout 
the resettlement process. In the case of Yamakoshi Village, 
public housing was even constructed within the former 
community, to preserve the community ties (Iuchi 2010a, 87). 
After the Chuetsu Earthquake, 336 units of affordable public 
rental housing were constructed, and another 121 units were 
provided for disaster-affected households using regular 
affordable housing programs (Iuchi 2010a, 79). All disaster 
survivors had moved out of temporary housing after three 
years, and relatively few public housing units were built 
compared to the number of households in temporary housing. 
Public housing was necessary to support the elderly popula-
tion who was unable to rebuild on their own. However, the 
financial support that was made available to homeowners in 
Chuetsu made it much easier for them to rebuild than it had 
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rebuilding and rent (Iuchi 2010a). Iuchi (2010a) explains the 
Urgent Rehabilitation of Affected Houses program, intended 
to support residents to repair their existing disaster-damaged 
homes. In addition to the households who could qualify under 
the restrictions of the national program (based on income, 
housing damage level, not living in temporary housing), the 
program administered by Niigata Prefecture did away with 
the income qualification and restriction on living in tempo-
rary housing, and covered residents with totally collapsed 
houses. At maximum, households with severely damaged 
houses could receive up to 1 million yen, and 0.5 million yen 
for largely damaged houses (Iuchi 2010a). 
Similarly, after the 2007 Noto Peninsula earthquake, also 
in Niigata Prefecture, homeowners were largely able to 
rebuild their houses, relying on a combination of financial 
support payments from the government, supplemented by 
loans, personal savings, or financial support from family 
members. Another example of similar support had been 
provided to residents after a 2000 earthquake in a rural area 
of Tottori Prefecture. Maki (2007) explains this case in which 
people who reconstructed their houses received a grant of 
USD 25,000 (3 million yen); and those who stayed in their 
original town received USD 12,500 to repair their houses. 
Part of the reason behind this program, which caused a gov-
ernmental budget failure, was to try to keep people in a rural 
area already facing depopulation. These examples show in the 
years since the recovery after the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 
the government changed policies and that there are some 
different possibilities for various support for homeowners.
7 Housing Situation in Tohoku after the 
11 March 2011 Earthquake and Tsunami
The magnitude 9.0 earthquake that struck off the coast of 
northeast Japan on 11 March 2011 and the resulting tsunami 
caused damage of a severity and a complexity never seen 
before in modern Japan. Although Japan has some of the best 
disaster prevention systems and policies in the world and this 
region regularly experiences tsunamis every 30–40 years, this 
tsunami of a scale that is repeated only every 1000 years 
exceeded all expectations and completely overwhelmed the 
disaster prevention measures in place. Close to 20,000 people 
lost their lives, including casualties and those who are desig-
nated as missing. The scale and complexity of the damage 
also makes the issues of recovery extremely complicated, and 
housing recovery is inextricably linked to other issues in the 
disaster stricken area, such as questions of relocation, land 
subsidence, lack of buildable land, and economic recovery in 
the context of an area that was already suffering from rural 
depopulation and a growing number of elderly residents. In 
addition, the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi 
reactor has added another layer of difficulty to the already 
complex challenges of reconstruction. In terms of the impact 
on housing recovery issues, evacuees fleeing nuclear radiation 
face extended or permanent displacement and their housing 
been for the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake survivors. In addition 
to direct compensation, there were several programs that 
targeted communities to promote livelihood recovery after 
the Chuetsu Earthquake. These included a collective relocation 
program for disaster prevention, a similar program for 
residential relocation from cliff areas that does not require 
collective relocation, and a residential area improvement 
program that is not usually used after disasters (Iuchi 2010a). 
Although these programs represented more variety and differ-
ent recovery options for communities in the disaster area, 
their benefit to individual households was strictly limited 
to those families that were following the same recovery 
approach selected by the community. In communities that 
selected group relocation, there was no support for residents 
who chose to rebuild on site. Conversely, in communities that 
selected rebuilding, there was no support for residents who 
relocated. 
6.3 Compensation for Homeowners
For disasters in Japan before the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earth-
quake, private donations were the main source of money for 
rebuilding. After the 1991 Unzen volcano eruption and the 
1993 Okushiri earthquake and tsunami, victims received 
more than USD 85,000 (10 million yen), which they could 
use to offset the cost of rebuilding their houses (Maki 2007). 
After the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, donations received 
constituted a huge sum, but the number of victims was also 
immense, so the amount that was distributed to each victim 
family was only USD 3300 (400,000 yen) (Maki 2007).
As Iuchi explains, “national laws supporting affected 
individuals do not exist,” since traditionally governments in 
Japan do not provide financial support directly to individual 
households as compensation for destroyed private property 
(Iuchi 2010a, 77). However, since the Hanshin-Awaji Earth-
quake there have been some changes in laws dealing with 
recovery. In April 1996, the Act on Support for Reconstruct-
ing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims was approved and a new 
Victims Life Recovery Support Act was put in place in 1999. 
This law supplied up to USD 8000 (1 million yen) per 
household in a grant for life recovery (Maki 2007). 
After the Chuetsu Earthquake in 2004, the amount speci-
fied in the law was increased to USD 25,000 (3 million yen) 
through the addition of the Housing Related Support Grant in 
an amount up to USD 17,000 (2 million yen); however, this 
money still could not be used for housing construction or 
repair—it could be used only to dismantle housing, pay loan 
costs, or rent (Maki 2007). Subsequently expanded to allow 
support for housing demolition and removal, each household 
could receive up to 3 million yen, according to housing 
damage, income, and age of the household head, and 2/3 
of this amount could be used for housing demolition and 
removal. In addition to this fund from the national govern-
ment, Niigata Prefecture provided a similar program that was 
less restricted by age or income, and financial support from 
the local government was allowed to be used for home 
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flexibility in the rehousing process, which signifies a poten-
tial to respond to residents’ varied housing needs, as well as 
more options for residents’ choice in the housing process.
It remains to be seen to what degree the future permanent 
housing reconstruction in Tohoku will be people-centered. 
One year after the disaster, there are too many unresolved 
questions about housing relocation, compensation for 
housing damage, and construction of public housing, to know 
what shape reconstruction will take. 
8 Conclusions—Towards a People-
Centered Housing Recovery
People-centered housing recovery includes policy, process, 
and housing form and choices that support disaster survivors 
in their life recovery. Since the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earth-
quake in Kobe, housing reconstruction policy in Japan 
has improved in some ways to become more responsive to 
residents’ needs. Looking ahead to consider housing recovery 
in the Tohoku region of Japan after the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami, it is imperative that we learn 
from and improve on past examples, especially those of Kobe 
and Chuetsu.
The single-track approach in Kobe, wherein government 
supported only in-kind temporary housing, followed by disas-
ter recovery public housing, did not provide compensation 
for owners of damaged homes. One of the most significant 
housing reconstruction policy changes since then is the 
current policy that provides financial support to homeowners. 
While this is clearly crucial support for a large number of 
disaster survivors, there are still restrictions based on the 
amount of damage sustained, which can leave residents 
with a partly damaged house that does not qualify for 
compensation unsupported.
The single-track approach to housing reconstruction in 
Kobe caused additional damage in the lives of disaster 
survivors. Specifically, the relocation, dispersal, and delays 
involved with living in typical temporary housing and disas-
ter recovery public housing made it difficult for people to be 
able to rebuild their lives. The system that was implemented 
after the Chuetsu Earthquake was more successful in keeping 
communities together throughout the rehousing process, and 
in some cases keeping people close to former villages. Using 
various programs for relocation or resettlement, communities 
could chose different options for their recovery, although 
if individual residents made reconstruction choices that 
were different from the community as a whole, they were 
not supported. In terms of housing reconstruction, one of the 
key aspects of recovery in Chuetsu is the larger amount of 
financial support that was provided to homeowners, which 
had a significant impact in making it possible for them to 
rebuild their own homes. 
Kobe’s reconstruction was the first time in recent years 
that the Japanese government faced recovery after a 
large-scale urban disaster. Clearly vast improvements were 
recovery is still uncertain. The scale of the current displace-
ment—over 340,000 people remain displaced more than one 
year later—and the complicated nature of a vast disaster area 
that spans multiple prefectures and many municipalities 
makes reconstruction more difficult to implement. Within the 
disaster region there are huge differences between areas with 
respect to damage, geography, culture, and housing needs.
From the housing recovery processes after the earthquakes 
in Kobe and Niigata, there are both examples of what to rep-
licate and to avoid, towards a goal of people-centered housing 
recovery. Although the negative impact of scattering residents 
randomly into temporary housing is known from the Kobe 
experience, this pattern has been repeated in many areas of 
Tohoku, as the scarcity of land and limitations of where tem-
porary housing can be built makes it impossible to keep many 
former communities together. Similarly, although the impact 
of randomized lottery selection contributed to the dispersal of 
Kobe pre-earthquake communities, this system was also 
used in many Tohoku municipalities. There are, however, 
examples of communities that were collectively relocated 
into temporary housing, or moved into temporary housing 
near their former neighborhoods. 
In the temporary housing units there are vast differences in 
quality of the buildings themselves as well as the surrounding 
living environment. Many of the same problems that plagued 
temporary housing in Kobe are being repeated in Tohoku—
such as low-quality and uncomfortable housing, distant 
relocation, fragmentation of communities, and inconvenient 
locations lacking transportation. However there are also 
examples of innovative design and construction—areas where 
local materials/traditional carpentry were used, and examples 
of wood construction that creates a more pleasant living 
space. There are also rare examples of temporary housing 
areas that were designed to create a more community-friendly 
space, and there are many non-profit, volunteer, or official 
initiatives to create spaces and events for community-
building and psychological support in temporary housing 
areas. 
In addition to the innovation in the form and quality 
represented by wooden temporary housing, another option 
used for the temporary housing phase represents a move 
toward people-centered housing: “designated temporary 
housing.” In this system that was introduced but not widely 
used after the Kobe earthquake, local governments can rent 
existing privately owned housing units and provide them to 
disaster survivors, rather than constructing new temporary 
housing units. In December 2011, there were over 66,000 of 
these designated temporary housing units in use, compared to 
52,000 conventional temporary housing units that were built 
after the disaster (Mainichi Daily News 2012). While there 
is the danger that people living in this housing type will be 
isolated from their former community or may lose access to 
recovery information, if these issues are resolved this system 
provides an important option for higher-quality housing at a 
lower cost to the government, and fewer delays in resettle-
ment. Using multiple methods of housing also creates more 
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implemented in housing recovery after the Chuetsu Earth-
quake, although the damage was of a much smaller and man-
ageable scale, compared to Kobe’s earthquake and the current 
situation in Tohoku. While the overall scale of the earthquake 
damaged area is much smaller, the scattered rural mountain 
communities that suffered disaster in Chuetsu may offer an 
important example for Tohoku, where there are also many 
smaller towns facing recovery. Providing an appropriate 
menu of options for these coastal communities and their 
residents will be an important part of reconstruction policy. 
The different communities in Chuetsu followed different 
process for reconstruction, including relocation and 
resettlement. Having options and incorporating flexibility in 
resettlement is a good start, and the options for individual 
residents must also be considered carefully.
Housing recovery in Tohoku will take many years, and the 
outcome is unknown. People-centered housing reconstruc-
tion in Tohoku will require resident participation and suffi-
cient housing options (both public and private) that support 
people in rebuilding their lives, communities, and livelihoods. 
For a people-centered housing recovery in Japan, the two pre-
dictable options—support for private housing reconstruction 
and provision of public housing for disaster victims—need to 
be reconsidered to address the broader needs of all residents. 
Hopefully this will be the case in Tohoku, and housing 
construction options will be made available in a way that 
is responsive to the needs of all residents for their life 
recovery. 
Notes
i UN-HABITAT underlines the importance of a people-centered approach, 
which instead of creating “passive victims,” emphasizes “building 
on people’s capacity, giving access to resources and responsibility for 
decision making” (UN-Habitat 2010, 2). 
ii UNDP emphasizes that, “people must be at the center of human develop-
ment, both as beneficiaries and drivers, as individuals and in groups. 
People must be empowered with the tools and knowledge to build their 
own communities, states, and nations” (UNDP 2011, 2).
iii BAPPENAS explains that after the 2004 tsunami in Banda Aceh, one of 
the principles adopted by the National Recovery and Reconstruction 
Strategy was: “A People-centered and participative process, where the 
administration listens to and understands the feelings and aspirations of 
the people” (BAPPENAS 2005, 2). In a Regional Meeting on the Post 
Tsunami People Centered Recovery Process in March 2005, organized 
in Sri Lanka by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR), in 
collaboration with Women Bank and Women Development networks and 
Sevanatha Urban Resource Center Slum Dwellers International (SDI) and 
the Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), ACHR defined 
a “People Centered Recovery Process” as one in which victims are 
consulted on what they want and given as much self-determination as 
possible on how that is to be achieved (ACHR 2005).
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